Personnel economics / Peter Kuhn
| データ種別 | 図書 |
|---|---|
| 出版者 | New York : Oxford University Press |
| 出版年 | c2018 |
| 本文言語 | 英語 |
| 大きさ | xix, 572 p. : ill. ; 25 cm |
所蔵情報を非表示
| 配架場所 | 巻 次 | 請求記号 | 資料番号 | 状 態 | コメント | ISBN | 請求メモ | 予約 | 仮想書架 | 指定図書 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 土:中央図書館閉架書庫 |
|
HF/5549pk | a0119000448b |
|
9780199378012 |
|
書誌詳細を非表示
| 内容注記 | Principal-agent models Structure of the principal-agent problem Solving the agent's problem Solving the principal's problem Best for whom? : efficiency and distribution Extensions: uncertainty, risk aversion and multiple tasks Noisy performance measures and optimal monitoring Evidence on employee motivation Empirical methods in personnel economics Performance pay at safelite glass : higher productivity, pay and profits Some "non-classical" motivators Reciprocity at work : gift exchange, implicit contracts, and trust Pigeons and pecks : incentives and income effects Employee selection and training Choosing qualifications Risky versus safe workers Recruitment : formal versus informal? broad versus narrow? Choosing from the Pool : testing,discretion, and self-selection Avoiding bias Setting pay levels : monopsony models Setting pay levels : efficiency wage models Training Competition in the workplace the economics of relative rewards A simple model of tournaments Some caveats: sabotage, collusion, and risk-taking in tournaments Unfair and uneven tournaments Who wants to compete? selection into tournaments Teams Incentives in teams and the free-rider problem Team production in practice Complementarity, substitutability and ability differences in teams Choosing teams: self-selection and team assignmen |
|---|---|
| 一般注記 | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| 著者標目 | *Kuhn, Peter, 1955- author |
| 件 名 | LCSH:Personnel management LCSH:Employee motivation LCSH:Teams in the workplace |
| 分 類 | LCC:HF5549 DC23:658.3 |
| 書誌ID | 1001186734 |
| ISBN | 9780199378012 |
| NCID | BB25466165 |
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